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I would venture to guess that, if most constitutional law types were
asked to free associate the first case they think of when hearing the
term unenumerated rights, Roe or Lochner would be blurted out the most
frequently. Or maybe Griswold. But probably not cases like Reynolds
v. Sims' or Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, which recognized an
equal right to vote in the absence of explicit constitutional language
about voting. Although Reynolds and Harper were controversial deci-
sions in their own time and still occasionally kick up a little dust, they
have not been nearly as hotly disputed or as publicly controversial as,
say, the modern privacy cases on procreative autonomy.
In this Essay, I suggest that straying from more familiar terrain
and examining the right to vote through the lens of the unenumer-
ated-rights debate can generate some valuable insights about that de-
bate. In particular, I stress two points: First, looking at the right to
vote from this vantage point suggests the sharp limitations of enu-
meration as a guiding concept in constitutional law. Enumeration as
a norm is plagued by significant uncertainties, including what is ar-
guably the crucial question: What counts as enumeration? That is,
just how specific does textual enumeration need to be to satisfy the
requirement? I will suggest that "enumerationism" itself cannot an-
swer this key question, and that it therefore does not-and cannot-
do the conceptual heavy lifting on its own. In fact, the interpreter
must rely on values extrinsic to enumeration itself in order to imple-
ment and give meaning to the enumeration norm. And the selection
of the relevant extrinsic values will-no surprise-end up giving the
interpreter the very kind of discretion that enumeration itself aspires
to cut off.
The second point I will explore relates to the normative justifica-
tion for an enumeration requirement. Restricting constitutional
rights to those with a textual basis is conventionally defended as pro-
moting democracy by leaving more questions to the political process.
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Democratic ideals are thus likely to be among the extrinsic values that
shape the working contours of enumeration. But democracy turns
out to be a problematic justification for enumerationism. It is para-
doxical, I will argue, to invoke democracy to object to a right that,
like the right to vote, is claimed to be precisely necessary for democ-
racy itself. I will argue, moreover, that just as the meaning of enu-
meration is contestable, so is the meaning of democracy itself. All of
this suggests, in turn, that there is considerable give on both sides of
the familiar, if crude, equation: enumeration = democracy.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF AN EQUAL PROTECTION BASED RIGHT TO VOTE:
FROM HAPPERSETTTO HARPER
A. Constitutional Text
The constitutional text on voting is sparse, but is practically boun-
tiful in the contemporary Constitution as compared to the original
document. The original Constitution provided no explicit right to
vote in state elections. The Constitution said more, but still relatively
little, about federal elections. Under Article I, Section 3, the Senate
was originally to be chosen by state legislatures, not voters, so there
was clearly no voting right implicated there.3 Article II, Section 1,
similarly affords no basis for finding a right to vote for the president
because it provides for the Electoral College and for each state legis-
lature to determine how that state's electors are selected.4  That
leaves the House of Representatives, which, under Article I, Section 2,
is to be "composed of Members chosen every second Year by the
People of the several States."5 Language requiring representatives to
be "chosen... by the People" contemplates a vote, and so might be
seen as conferring an implied right to vote, but is notably silent both
on who is to be included in the "People" and on how elections are
otherwise to be run. On this point, the Section says only that the
qualifications for "the Electors" of United States House members are
to be the same as those for the "Electors of the most numerous
Branch of the State Legislature. 6 The text of Article I thus crucially
relies on state law to determine who is permitted to vote in House
elections. Finally, Article I, Section 4 states that state legislatures shall
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof. . . ."), amended by U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII, § 1.
4 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress... ").




ordinarily prescribe "[t]he Times, Places and Manner" of congres-
sional elections, subject to congressional power to make regulations
in most cases.7 This reference to elections once again suggests the
contemplation of federal voting, though not any affirmative grant of
a voting right. In sum, the original Constitution did not independ-
ently define or protect voting rights and left matters of the franchise
largely in the hands of the state.
A number of provisions concerning voting have subsequently
been added to the constitutional text, and these have contributed to
a steady erosion of what was once conceived as the nearly plenary
power of the states in regard to the franchise. The Seventeenth
Amendment brought the Senate into line with the House by provid-
ing that each state's senators were to be "elected by the people" and
by invoking the voter-qualification standard applicable to "the most
numerous branch of the State legislatures.,8 The Fifteenth, Nine-
teenth, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Amendments each forbade
denying or abridging the right to vote-the Fifteenth "on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude"; the Nineteenth "on
account of sex"; the Twenty-fourth for "failure to pay a poll tax or
other tax" in a federal election; and the Twenty-sixth "on account of
age."9 The Fourteenth Amendment did not expressly include voting
in Section 1, which contains the more generally worded Equal Pro-
tection, Due Process, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses. But Sec-
tion 2 of that Amendment did address voting through its express pro-
vision for reduced representation. The relevant language subjects a
state to losing a portion of the congressional seats to which it would
otherwise be entitled by virtue of its population if it denies the vote to
male citizens who are at least twenty-one years old, unless such citi-
zens have "participat[ed] in rebellion, or other crime. '
B. Supreme Court Interpretation
The Supreme Court's evolving understanding of a constitutionally
protected right to vote has unfolded against this sparse textual back-
drop. For many years, the Court categorically denied that there was
any federal constitutional right to vote. In Minor v. Happersett, the
Supreme Court bluntly said that "the Constitution of the United
States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one."'" The
Court said this in the course of rejecting a claim that Missouri had
7 Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
8 Id. amend. XVII, cl. 1.
9 Id. amend. XV, § 1; id. amend. XIX, cl. 1; id. amend. XXIV, § 1; id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
10 Id. amend. XIV, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
1 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875).
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violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying the vote to women,
reasoning that women were citizens, but citizenship did not necessar-
ily include suffrage. 2 The opinion also emphasized that the "United
States has no voters in the States of its own creation" because voter
qualifications, even for federal elections, depend entirely on state
law."3  This language was repeated and endorsed in cases such as
United States v. Cruikshank," a case in which race-based discrimination
in voting was alleged, and Pope v. Williams, where the Court said that
" [t] he privilege to vote in any State is not given by the Federal Consti-
tution, or by any of its amendments.'
5
But the story is, of course, not nearly so simple. In fact, the Court
soon strayed from Happersett's dual notions that there is no constitu-
tionally protected voting right and that states alone create federal
voters (and, implicitly, voting structures). Over time, the Court recast
voting rights as having a significant federal dimension. Early deci-
sions establishing the parameters of congressional power to regulate
voting helped to set the Supreme Court on this path. 16 The march
toward conceptualizing voting as protected by the Federal Constitu-
tion was not unbroken, for the language in late nineteenth-century
decisions equivocated. But the march continued nevertheless, cul-
minating in the opinion in United States v. Classic, which decisively
pronounced the right to vote to be "established and guaranteed by
the Constitution." 8
It remained for the Supreme Court's later decisions in Reynolds v.
Sims 9 in 1964 and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections20 in 1966 to be-
gin to give real content and contours to the right to vote. Reynolds
12 Id. at 165, 174-75 (finding that, while "[t] here is no doubt that women may be citizens,"
suffrage was not an absolute right granted to all citizens).
13 Id. at 170.
14 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1876) ("In Minor v. Happersett, we decided that the Constitution of the
United States has not conferred the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the United States
have no voters of their own creation in the States." (citation omitted)).
15 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904).
16 See, e.g., Ex parteYarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 664 (1884) (recognizing that the Constitution
adopts state-level qualifications for voters, but stressing this did not indicate that the "right to
vote for a member of Congress was not fundamentally based upon the Constitution," especially
in light of the Fifteenth Amendment, which reflects that the right to vote was of "supreme im-
portance to the national government"); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 383-84 (1880) (discuss-
ing how Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution allows cooperation between Congress and
the states in making regulations covering elections, but stating the "power of Congress over the
subject is paramount" because it may "make or alter such regulations" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
17 See, e.g., McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1892) (according states broad power
with respect to the method of selecting presidential electors and characterizing the Fifteenth
Amendment in more limited terms).
Is 313 U.S. 299, 314-15 (1941).
19 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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built upon three earlier cases. The first was Baker v. Carr, which re-
nounced the rule that malapportionment claims were nonjusticiable
political questions. 2 The next was Gray v. Sanders, where the Court
rejected a "county unit" system that aggregated votes on a per-county
basis.2  That system diluted the power of populous urban counties
and enhanced the power of their more sparsely populated rural
counterparts. Invoking the Equal Protection Clause, the Court said
in Gray that "all who participate in the election are to have an equal
vote."2  Notably, however, Justice Douglas's opinion in Gray did not
restrict itself to equal protection. Perhaps foreshadowing the pen-
umbral approach that he would soon famously advance in Griswold v.
Connecticut,14 Douglas instead opted for something that, if properly
called enumeration at all, was more like panenumeration: "[t]he
conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independ-
ence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth,
and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person,
one vote."25 Finally, in Wesberry v. Sanders, the Court struck down
malapportioned congressional districts and sounded a similar theme
about equality.2 6 This time, however, the Court read into the text of
Article I, Section 2, a strong-if textually questionable-equality
principle.27
Reynolds followed closely on the heels of these three cases and im-
posed a one-person-one-vote requirement on state elections through
the Equal Protection Clause. In doing so, the Court used robust
rhetoric about the right to vote, casting it as central based on its abil-
ity to protect other rights:
A predominant consideration in determining whether a State's legislative
apportionment scheme constitutes an invidious discrimination violative
of rights asserted under the Equal Protection Clause is that the rights al-
legedly impaired are individual and personal in nature.... Undoubtedly,
the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic so-
ciety. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and un-
impaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights,
any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized.2 s
2 369 U.S. 186, 231 (1962).
372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963).
23 Id. at 379.
24 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (asserting that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have pe-
numbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and sub-
stance").
25 Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
26 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
27 Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 refers to apportionment "among the several States," not
within individual states. See Wesbeny, 376 U.S. at 25-45 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
28 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
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The strong language characterizing the right to vote as preservative
of other rights was derived from dicta in the Court's decision in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins,2 another equal protection case, and has become one
of Reynolds's signature phrases.
Rhetoric like this, focusing as it does on the instrumental central-
ity of voting to politics, would suggest that Reynolds recognized an un-
qualified constitutional right to vote. But in terms of both its holding
and its justification, the case was about voting equality, not voting per
se. The plaintiffs' claim was one of voting dilution, not deprivation,
so the focal point was voters' equality in relation to one another.
Consider the Court's framing of the right:
[E]ach and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective par-
ticipation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies. Most
citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters through the
election of legislators to represent them. Full and effective participation
by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen
have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state leg-
islature. Modern and viable state government needs, and the Constitu-
tion demands, no less.30
The emphasis on citizens having an "equally effective voice" in elec-
tions, if utopian, signals that Reynolds was grounded in ideas of politi-
cal equality, not unfettered political liberty.
Where Reynolds concerned vote dilution, the Court's 1966 deci-
sion in Harper striking down the poll tax in state elections more di-
rectly implicated the right to vote itself. Those failing to pay the Vir-
ginia tax were turned away at the polls. The Court began its analysis
with the constitutional text, noting in passing and as if it had never
been controversial that "the right to vote in federal elections is con-
ferred by Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution."" More pertinent to the
Virginia poll tax, the opinion proceeded to say that, while "the right
to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned [in the Con-
stitution]," it was nevertheless protected.3 2 The Court noted, but did
not engage, the argument that the First Amendment might give rise
to an implicit right to vote in state elections." It instead saw the case
as crucially about inequality, saying that "once the franchise is
granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsis-
tent with the Equal Protection Clause."34 Justice Douglas distin-
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) ("Though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privi-
lege merely conceded by society according to its will, under certain conditions, nevertheless it is
regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.").
30 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.






guished the decision in Lassiter v. Northhampton County Board of Elec-
tions, decided seven years earlier, which had upheld the use of literacy
tests in North Carolina.3 5 The opinion argued that literacy had some
reasonable relation to the right to vote, but wealth did not.36 The
Court in Harper thus characterized the case as one of "invidious dis-
crimination." T
Had enumeration been its central preoccupation, the Harper
Court might have pursued a different doctrinal path. The year be-
fore Harper was decided, the Supreme Court had decided Harman v.
Forssenius, a case that struck down an attempt by Virginia to evade the
Twenty-fourth Amendment's ban on poll taxes in federal elections. 38
Once it became clear that the Twenty-fourth Amendment would pass,
Virginia abolished the poll tax as an absolute prerequisite for federal
elections, while maintaining the tax for state elections. In response
to the new federal amendment, Virginia enacted a law requiring vot-
ers in federal contests either to pay the poll tax or to file proof of resi-
dence six months before the election. ° The Court found the law to
be a sophisticated means of evasion and struck it down as violative of
the Twenty-fourth Amendment.4' In the course of its analysis, how-
ever, the Court alluded to what might qualify as the mother of all
smoking guns-a statement from the 1902 Virginia Constitutional
Convention, at which the state first wrote a poll tax into its constitu-
tion:
Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we propose; that, exactly, is
what this Convention was elected for-to discriminate to the very extrem-
ity of permissible action under the limitations of the Federal Constitu-
tion, with a view to the elimination of every negro voter who can be got-
ten rid of, legally, without materially impairing the numerical strength of
the white electorate.42
Recall that when Virginia passed the law struck down in Harman, it
retained the poll tax for state elections that was subsequently struck
35 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959). For subsequent statutory elimination of literacy tests, see Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973b (2000)).
36 Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 53-54.
37 Harper, 383 U.S. at 668 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38 380 U.S. 528, 544 (1965). 1 am indebted to Pam Karlan for a conversation about this case.
:9 Id. at 531.
0 Id. at 532.
41 Id. at 544.
42 Id. at 543 (quoting 2 VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (PROCEEDINGS AND
DEBATES, 1901-1902), at 3076-77 (statement of Rep. Glass)). The opinion went on to assert
that "[t]his statement was characteristic of the entire debate on the suffrage issue; the only real
controversy was whether the provisions eventually adopted were sufficient to accomplish the
disenfranchisement of the Negro." Id. at 543 n.23 (citing 2 VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION (PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, 1901-1902), at 2937-3080).
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down in Harper. The availability of this blatant evidence of racial in-
tent suggests that the Harper Court could have confidently struck
down the Virginia poll tax as straightforward race discrimination un-
der either the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth Amendment. The evi-
dence seems more than sufficient to satisfy any intent test the Court
might have chosen to apply under either of these Amendments. 4s It is
noteworthy that the Court in Harper declined to take this more "enu-
merated," or at least more well-established, path by striking down the
poll tax as a form of race-based voting discrimination. One might
reasonably read the Court's failure to do so as reflecting an interest
in elaborating a more general right of political equality.
Near the end of the Harper opinion, Justice Douglas resisted Jus-
tice Black's charge, in dissent,4 that the Court was illegitimately writ-
ing a political theory into the Constitution. Douglas responded with
a gesture toward Justice Holmes's iconic reference to Herbert
Spencer and economic theory in the famous Lochner dissent:
[T] he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a
particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality,
any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what
41was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights.
The language drawing a parallel to due process based fundamen-
tal rights is significant, for it frames the voting right in the terms in
which it has come to be commonly understood-as part of the fun-
damental rights branch of equal protection. In light of language like
this and in other cases, 6 it is not surprising that it is commonly said
that "the Supreme Court repeatedly has declared that the right to
vote is a fundamental right protected under equal protection.,
4
Yet, notwithstanding the broad language of Reynolds and Harper,
the Court has also said a number of times that there is no constitu-
tional right to vote per se. Indeed, in later cases, the Court has re-
peated and, to some extent, refined the understanding of the right to
vote as relational, not categorical. In two important footnotes to the
majority opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
for example, the Court said that "the right to vote, per se, is not a con-
43 The intent requirements imposed on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality
opinion), respectively, were imposed after Harper. The Voting Rights Act was subsequently
amended to create a remedy for voting discrimination in the absence of proof of intent. See
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134.
4 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 678 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 669 (majority opinion).
46 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969) ("Statutes granting
the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens
any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantively affect their lives.").
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 842 (2d ed. 2002).
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stitutionally protected right,, 48 but that "a citizen has a constitutionally
protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other
citizens in the jurisdiction., 49 The relational framing of the right was
again emphasized with the controversial application of the voting
right in Bush v. Gore, where the Court relied on Reynolds and Harper to
hold that, "[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms,
the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value
one person's vote over that of another.,
5
II. IS THE RIGHT TO VOTE UNENUMERATED?
To the extent that the Reynolds-Harper right has been character-
ized as unenumerated, the characterization has been fueled by the
doctrinal grounding of the right in the fundamental interests branch
of the Equal Protection Clausei' Some have dubbed that branch of
equal protection analysis "substantive equal protection," a slogan
meant to underscore "the parallel to substantive due process., 52 And,
as might have been predicted by Justice Douglas's language in the
Harper opinion, 5 some have suggested that the Reynolds-Harper right
was framed in the language of equal protection principally to avoid
the accusation of Lochner-ism that may have greeted the announce-
54ment of a liberty-based, categorical right to vote.
411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973).
49 Id. at 34 n.74 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)).
50 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (per curiam). There have been a number of
significant cases since Reynolds and Harper that have given some contours and texture to the
equal right to vote, leading among them cases like Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395
U.S. 621 (1969), which concerned voter qualifications for particular kinds of elections, and
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), which concerned felony disenfranchisement. I do not
probe applications of the Reynolds-Harper right because my more limited focus is on the framing,
logic, and justification of the right to vote itself.
See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1509 (2002)
(noting that the "unenumerated interest" in voting has been protected under the fundamental
rights strand of equal protection doctrine); Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA.
L. REV. 951, 962 n.35 (2002) (noting that the right to vote, although "not independently pro-
tected" is, nonetheless, a fundamental right triggering heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause); cf James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 34
(1995) ("The 'unenumerated' right to vote is justified because it is a significant precondition
for deliberative democracy.. ").
52 Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telphase of Substantive
Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 77 n.131; see also Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic
Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 101-02 (comparing substantive
due process to substantive equal protection); cf Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process,
and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 477-80 (2002) (arguing that
Haler is best seen as combining aspects of both equal protection and due process).
See supra text accompanying notes 31-45.
See Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981,
994 (1979) ("[T]he equal protection clause did for the Warren Court precisely what the due
process clause did for the Lochner-era Court-it served as a vehicle for judicial intervention in
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Equal protection rhetoric aside, casting the right as "fundamen-
tal" has proven to be a bit of an attractive nuisance for critics of un-
enumerated rights because such critics often object to unenumerated
and fundamental rights on the same grounds. Robert Bork and Lino
Graglia, for example, criticize both unenumerated and fundamental
rights as antidemocratic. s Their argument is the familiar one that
charges judges with finding textually unsupported, bogus "rights"
that have the effect of removing from the ordinary political process
questions that should be decided by the electorate's chosen represen-
tatives. Despite this common critique of unenumerated and funda-
mental rights, however, the two categories are distinct in certain ways.
Fundamentality is a very old idea in constitutional interpretation, 56
and it goes to importance, while enumeration goes to textual specific-
ity. The perceived importance of a right may, of course, be relevant
to a court's willingness to find it within constitutional text, or despite
the absence of clear constitutional text. But the two adjectives never-
theless describe different things.
Moreover, not all fundamental rights are unenumerated. The
Sixth Amendment, to name one of many examples, is said to create a
"fundamental" right to a jury trial in federal criminal cases through
its explicit text.57 And if it is in fact less objectionable to call a right
"fundamental" if it is enumerated, then the two categories may mutu-
ally shape and modify one another in interesting ways. The broader a
view one takes about what constitutes enumeration, the smaller the
set of assertedly illegitimate fundamental rights.
That takes us to the key question: Is the Reynolds-Harper funda-
mental voting right necessarily unenumerated? It is sometimes char-
acterized in those terms,8 but one might well argue the contrary
proposition. The voting right might, instead, be seen as enumerated
because it falls within the broadly worded terms of, and the textually
state policy choices to promote a set of values responsive to the Justices' vision of political and
social ideals."); see alsoJames A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Po-
litical Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 893, 972 (1997) (arguing
that the Warren Court "could not feasibly rely on the doctrine of substantive due process" after
Lochner); Karlan, supra note 52, at 479 (characterizing the Harper decision's use of equal protec-
tion as "largely an artifact of the Warren Court's decision to avoid the then-discredited idea of
substantive due process").
5 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
352-53 (1990) (criticizing interpretive theories that empower courts as impairing "the full right
of self-government"); Lino A. Graglia, The Constitution and "Fundamental Rights", in THE FRAMERS
AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 86, 97-101 (Robert A. Licht ed., 1991) (arguing that judicial activ-
ism is usurping the established authority of majority rule).
SeeMarburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The principles, therefore, so
established, are deemed fundamental.").
57 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968) (deeming the Sixth Amend-
mentjury-trial right a "fundamental right").
58 See supra note 51.
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unqualified equality norm created by, the Equal Protection Clause.
This interpretive hypothesis would proceed from the fact that the
enumerated text of the Clause fails to exclude voting laws from the
class of laws subject to the equal protection requirement.
Does this hypothesis reflect a sound understanding of enumera-
tion? Confining our attention to constitutional text for the moment,
there are various interpretive counterarguments that might defeat
this suggestion that the Reynolds-Harper right should be seen as enu-
merated. One objection might flow from the Representation Reduc-
tion Clause in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which spe-
cifically provides a representational sanction for states that deny the
vote to male citizens twenty-one or older, except in specified circum-
stances. 9 Echoing Justice Harlan's dissent in Reynolds, Raoul Berger
inferred that Section 2 was the only provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment that was intended to deal with voting.60 Yet, as a textual
matter alone, this argument is problematic for several reasons. First,
the text of Section 2 is considerably less significant than it once might
have been because subsequent amendments have made much of that
Section obsolete by specifically barring race, sex, and age discrimina-
tion in voting.6' Second, Section 2's representational sanction might
reasonably be read to address only the denial of voting to males over
twenty-one, and not other voting-related matters like reapportion-
ment or the poll tax. Indeed, many scholars parsing the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment have concluded, contrary to
59 The Clause allows states to exclude only those male citizens over twenty-one who par-
ticipated in crimes:
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and
Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. On the Reduction of
Representation Clause, see Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth
Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 587, 589-93 (2001).
60 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 70-89 (1977) (arguing that Section 1 did not provide Congress with
control over voting rights); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 594 (1964) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) ("The comprehensive scope of the second section and its particular reference to the
state legislatures preclude the suggestion that the first section was intended to have the result
reached by the Court today."); cf Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-55 (1974) (relying on
Section 2's specific language about criminals to reject a challenge to felony disenfranchisement
under Section 1).
61 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (race); id. amend. XIX, cl. 1 (sex); id. amend. XXVI, § 1
(age). For a particularly aggressive form of this argument, see Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction,
Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 291-92 (2004). One need not necessarily go as far as
Chin does to say, more modestly, that later amendments have diminished the relevance of Sec-
tion 2 to voting-rights jurisprudence.
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Harlan's and Berger's. conclusions, that the legislative history is in-
conclusive and does not necessarily support the idea that Section 2
bars reading Section 1 as an independent source of protection for
voting rights.62 As Neil Komesar has pointed out, the fact that there
may have been insufficient votes to include language protecting suf-
frage does not mean that there were necessarily sufficient votes to ex-
clude such protection.63  And, of course, no such exclusion does ap-
pear in the text, so it seems at least plausible to conclude that the
drafters intended to leave to later interpreters the meaning of Sec-
tion 1 in relation to voting equality.
Consider a different textual objection to viewing the Equal Protec-
tion Clause as sufficient to establish the Reynolds-Harper right as enu-
merated: its relative vagueness compared to the specificity of the Fif-
teenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments,
which ban voting restrictions based on race, sex, poll taxes in federal
elections, and age, respectively.64 The specificity of these provisions
might be enlisted to support the negative inference that nothing else
in the Constitution protects voting equality.65 This is a version of the
specific-trumps-the-general notion in interpretation. But this reading
also has its shortcomings. The words in the voting-rights Amend-
ments can be sensibly parsed in the opposite direction. One might,
indeed, take a textual tack and read the language in the voting-rights
Amendments referring to the "right to vote" not being denied or
abridged on the textually specified bases as evidence that some "right
to vote," in fact, predated these Amendments. And, since each of
these Amendments was enacted after the Equal Protection Clause, the
general equality command in the Fourteenth Amendment might
62 The most extensive argument of this kind appears in William W. Van Alstyne, The Four-
teenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-ninth Congress, 1965 Sup.
CF. REV. 33. For other analyses pointing in a similar direction, see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 276-78 (1970) (plurality) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part and con-
curring in part), WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 49-63 (1988), and Michael Kent Curtis, John A. Bingham and
the Story of American Liberty: The Lost Cause Meets the "Lost Clause," 36 AKRON L. REV. 617, 644-45
(2003).
Neil K. Komesar, Back to the Future-An Institutional View of Making and Interpreting Constitu-
tions, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 191, 204-08 (1987) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment may not
have passed had its drafters made explicit either a right to vote or an exclusion of that right).
This question is especially relevant in relation to the Twenty-fourth Amendment, banning
poll taxes in federal elections, and Harper, which invalidated poll taxes in state elections.
65 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 611-12 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments would not have been necessary had the Four-
teenth protected voting rights); BERGER, supra note 60, at 104-05 (same); cf Minor v. Happer-
sett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1875) ("If suffrage was one of [the] privileges or immunities
[protected by the Fourteenth Amendment], why amend the Constitution to prevent its being
denied on account of race, &c.?").
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plausibly be read to be the textual source of such a preexisting voting
right.
Another difficulty with reading the specific voting-rights Amend-
ments to preclude the Reynolds-Harper voting right is the contestable
assumption that an atomized interpretation of the four voting-rights
Amendments is the only, or the best, way to read them. One might,
for example, instead read these Amendments collectively, as reflect-
ing a strong equality norm in voting, an evolving consensus of sorts.66
That norm, in turn, might strengthen, rather than undercut, the idea
that the Equal Protection Clause should be read to protect equality in
voting-related areas as a general matter, as it protects equality in
other realms.
In thinking about the Equal Protection Clause as a plausible
enumeration of the Reynolds-Harper right, it is worth noticing that the
Fourteenth Amendment is not the only constitutional provision that
might support the results in Reynolds and Harper. Some have sug-
gested, for example, that the First Amendment offers an appropriate
source of protection against the laws challenged in Reynolds and
Harper. These theories cast voting as a form of political expression
and voice. Others have suggested that the Guarantee Clause, freed of
its judicially imposed justiciability barriers,68 would have been the bet-
ter choice, stressing the dependency of republican government on
69voting. Indeed, no less a critic of unenumerated rights than Borkargued that the malapportionment challenged in Baker v. Carr should
66 See, e.g., Mark C. Alexander, Money in Political Campaigns and Modern Vote Dilution, 23 IAW
& INEQ. 239, 261-78 (2005) (interpreting constitutional amendments protecting the right to
vote as reflecting a deep commitment to political equality); cf Dorf, supra note 51, at 973-87
(arguing that the voting-rights Amendments combine with the Equal Protection Clause to form
a "general equality provision" of the Constitution); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 968-76 (2002) (find-
ing in the Nineteenth Amendment a strong principle of gender equality linked to the Four-
teenth Amendment).
67 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("The right to vote
derives from the right of association that is at the core of the First Amendment.... ."); Guy-
Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of Association, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1255-60 (2003) (finding protection for voting in the First Amendment right
of association); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 20, 52-59 (1975) (arguing that the First Amendment's implicit equality principle pro-
tects voting rights as political expression).
68 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (deeming the Guarantee Clause of
Article IV nonjusticiable); cf Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149-50 (1912)
(calling the division "between judicial authority over justiciable controversies and legislative
power as to purely political questions" a "settled distinction").
69 See BORK, supra note 55, at 85-86 (maintaining that the Guarantee Clause should be ap-
plied because a republican form of government should allow the majority to govern); Cf. JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICAL REVIEW 118-23 (1980) (arguing
that reapportionment decisions are best understood as grounded in a reading of the Constitu-
tion that combines the Equal Protection and Guarantee Clauses).
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have been struck down based on the Guarantee Clause because it sys-
tematically blocked majority rule.7°
There are significant conceptual differences among these three
constitutional principles-equality, expression, and republican form
of government-that might lead theories of voting rights shaped by
each to play out differently for various reasons. But they are little dif-
ferent from one another in terms of enumeration. That is, none is
meaningfully "more enumerated" than the others, and they, in fact,
share the same interpretive structure: each reasons from a general
constitutional norm to a specific right in a way that is utterly unre-
markable in conventional constitutional jurisprudence.
All of this suggests that, in the face of a claim that a general con-
stitutional provision (like the Equal Protection Clause) supports a
specific right (like the equal right to vote), the unenumerated-rights
idea cannot autonomously tell us what counts as enumeration. The
enumeration norm is, in this important sense, hollow at its core. Put
differently, this is a version of a baseline problem: there simply is no
interpretive standard of expected specificity to which we can turn.
Indeed, if there were any such baseline, it would likely be one of ex-
pected generality. The profusion of broad and undetailed constitu-
tional provisions makes it difficult to cast textual specificity as the de-
fault position. It is, thus, perverse for those devoted to the virtues of
writtenness to deny the fair interpretive inference that flows from the
character of much of the Constitution's written text.
III. FINDING A METRIC FOR ENUMERATION
This empty-enumeration problem suggests that the metric for
specificity must come from outside the enumeration preference itself.
Where else might that metric be found? One favorite place that
enumeration enthusiasts tend to turn is to theories of originalism.
While there is conceptual affinity between enumerationism and
originalism, it is important to distinguish between them. Originalism
is a contestable evidentiary theory of what the possibly enumerating
words mean. And often, of course, original meaning is hotly dis-
puted. One can see a good and germane example of this interpretive
uncertainty by contrasting Raoul Berger's and William W. Van Al-
styne's reckonings of what, if anything, the Fourteenth Amendment's
drafters meant in relation to voting rights.7'
70 BORK, supra note 55, at 85-86.
71 Compare BERGER, supra note 60, at 70-74 (arguing that the Amendment's legislative history
proves intent not to interfere with malapportionment practices), with Van Alstyne, supra note




Moreover, there is a significant potential tension between enu-
merationism and originalism. The two are often embraced by fellow
travelers, but there may well be more friction than harmony between
the two ideas. This is because enumeration of broad values like
equality (or free speech, liberty, or republican government) might
itself be understood to militate against a search for any specific origi-
nal intent. The drafters' very choice to employ broad text would
seem to support the idea that such clauses were not intended to be
tightly tethered to any originally contemplated set of particular prob-
lems. The character of the enumerated text, in other words, might
well be seen to undercut the legitimacy of searching for the unenu-
merated, specific, original intent.
If originalism does not work, perhaps a better place to look to re-
solve the level of specificity necessary to constitute enumeration is to
the values driving the enumeration norm-that is, to the conceptual
justification for insisting upon enumerated text in the first instance.
There is a range of plausible answers to that question, but the most
familiar and important one flows from ideas about democracy.72 The
majoritarian would say that we should insist upon enumeration be-
cause it leaves more decisions to the political process and fewer to the
courts.73 The crude calculation is that the more textual specificity
that is required before a court can find a right, the more democracy
the polity gets.
For several reasons, democracy alone won't work as the relevant
rule on specificity. One reason is that it is too general to be of much
help in determining the quantum of specificity necessary in particu-
lar cases. Consider the voting example: With the normative pull of
democracy firmly in mind, we still know that the Fourteenth
Amendment contains a general equality norm that does not exclude
voting, and we still don't know if that is sufficiently specific to satisfy
the demands of enumeration. And, as I have suggested, there are
simply too many generalized constitutional commands to support any
categorical, democracy-driven requirement of exacting specificity.
More importantly, perhaps, there is a deeper paradox here: the
democratic case against unenumerated rights is tautological when
applied to a right that is precisely claimed to be demanded by de-
mocracy. How, in other words, can democracy be the grounds to
deny the equal-voting right said to be vital to supporting democracy
72 Other obvious candidates include arguments relating to institutional competence and
rule-of-law values like certainty, notice, and predictability.
73 See BERGER, supra note 60, at 85-90 (arguing that the legislative history of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause favors leaving more decision to the political process); BORK, supra note 55, at
352-53 (arguing for "untidy" political responses to moral problems rather than courts' "abstract
generalizations"); Graglia, supra note 55, at 97-101 (characterizing fundamental rights deci-
sions as illegitimately wresting control from the political process).
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itself? Here we begin to see a central point: the Constitution plays a
necessary, if contested, role in constituting democracy.
To put it another way, democracy is itself unenumerated. There
are many textual provisions that might be understood to articulate
democratic norms and values, but they don't all point in the same di-
rection or correspond to the same underlying view of democracy.
The skeletal outlines of representative democracy are traced in the
Constitution, but much about the meaning and requirements of de-
mocracy is left to be decided. Broadly worded structural provisions
creating majoritarian political institutions coexist with broadly
worded norms about such core democratic values as free expression,
equality, liberty, and citizenship. Sometimes, applying these different
provisions to the same set of facts produces different results. And we
must consider, not only these multiple pieces of democracy-shaping
constitutional text, but also the structural inferences-inferences that
further complicate the concept of enumeration. All of this makes it
problematic to rely on simple appeals to something thought self-
evidently to be "democracy" as a way to defeat constitutional rights
claimed to lack a sufficient basis in text.
Consider an example of the plural meanings of democracy that
can be distilled from the Constitution. In Romer v. Evans, the Su-
preme Court struck down a state constitutional initiative passed by
Colorado voters that would have eliminated existing laws banning
discrimination based on sexual orientation and made ay persons
categorically ineligible for the protection of such laws. Different
understandings of democracy, each plausibly grounded in the Fed-
eral Constitution, might point in very different directions in analyz-
ing the constitutionality of the anti-gay rights initiative.75 A majori-
tarian democrat would presumably favor allowing the electorate to
decide, by voting, whether this kind of discrimination should be
barred or allowed. A republican democrat, by contrast, might well
object to giving the mechanisms of direct democracy such broad lati-
tude to trump and proactively preempt policy decisions made by
elected representatives. And an advocate of cultural democracy
might object, on different grounds, to the sweeping exclusion of gay
persons from what the Romer Court called the domain of "ordinary
civic life."
76
Democracy, in other words, has multiple meanings that are some-
times sharply opposed. This makes it hard to determine both what
the Constitution says about democracy and what it means to use de-
74 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996).
75 I explore Romer through the lens of democracy in Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and
Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV. 361 (1997).
76 517 U.S. at 631.
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mocracy as the value shaping the contours of the enumeration norm.
One response to these quandaries from an enumeration enthusiast
might be to suggest that there is no reason not to let the democratic
process decide questions of democracy. Avoid the confusing welter
of potential constitutional ideas about democracy, such a person
might say, by tightly linking constitutional provisions to their explicit
textual meaning, and thereby letting the political process-not the
Constitution-define democracy's meaning and its requirements.
But if we take Reynolds and Harper as the examples, we can quickly see
the difficulty with the let-democracy-decide-what's-democratic solu-
tion. It is not hard to see why it is objectionable on democratic
grounds to leave significant policy questions about democracy to the
vote-diluted polity of Reynolds or to the skewed-against-the-poor polity
of Harper. Moreover, as John Hart Ely lucidly saw, it is problematic to
expect incumbent elected officials to change a system that benefits
them, whether that system might be said to violate constitutionally
grounded democratic precepts or not."
In short, once we focus closely on the role of democracy, we can
see the limits of the enumeration principle, because it becomes clear
how little work the idea of enumeration itself actually does in the
analysis. Because we need to look beyond the idea of enumeration to
draw the essential lines, it begins to look like a weak principle on
both the descriptive and normative levels. It is weak as a descriptive
matter because it crucially fails to tell us how much specificity is re-
quired to constitute enumeration. It is weak as a normative matter
because it, in fact, relies on independent normative principles like
democracy to make sense of enumeration itself.
All of this leaves us needing to work out the paradox of resolving
what democracy requires when the very right claimed is said to be
necessary for democracy. This presents a new set of line-drawing is-
sues. On the one hand, for the structural reasons that are so well il-
lustrated by Reynolds and Harper themselves, we can't sustainably pre-
fer that democratic institutions resolve all rules of democracy. But we
also ought not expect courts to design every aspect of democracy
through the vehicle of constitutional interpretation. That would be
unworkable, given the vast array of macro- and micro-institutional
choices involved in a democratic political process. And it would also
be undesirable to cut the populace out of shaping any aspects of de-
mocratic institutions.
This dilemma might thus be restated as a question: Which sorts of
democratic questions should be resolved at the constitutional level,
and which at the political level? We might draw the line where the
7 ELY, supra note 69, at 105-34.
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structural difficulties in the political process are greatest.18 We might,
instead, draw the line based on the rights thought utterly essential to
democracy.79 Or we might just need better lines altogether. Wher-
ever the line is drawn, however, the Reynolds and Harper rights should
fare well in the analysis; the arguments supporting an equal right to
vote are strong, whether we see it in terms of structure or individual
rights.
IV. CONCLUSION: BEYOND VOTING
My analysis has stressed two points: First, that enumeration suffers
as an interpretive principle because of its inability to determine in
any autonomous kind of way what counts as enumeration; and sec-
ond, that democracy is a more problematic justification for enumera-
tion than is ordinarily supposed because democracy is itself unenu-
merated. One might well ask whether voting is sui generis in ways
that limit the relevance of these points to the larger debate about un-
enumerated rights. Let me suggest that voting does plainly have spe-
cial relevance to democratic theory, but that the points explored here
are nevertheless suggestive for the larger debate.
The empty-enumeration problem I have described is as relevant to
interpreting, say, the word "liberty" in the Constitution as it is to in-
terpreting the word "equality" in the context of voting because the
basic issue is the same: the enumeration norm cannot clearly tell us
what counts as enumeration. Further, the point about democracy be-
ing unenumerated carries over, since the issue is the open texture of
democracy itself. The Constitution does not clearly specify what de-
mocracy means, nor does it clearly establish which clauses or
amendments should be seen as required by the democracy that the
Constitution helps to constitute. Nor, crucially, does the Constitution
clearly confine democracy to the formal apparatus of politics.
The Romer example introduced earlier makes these points about
democracy's own unenumerated character. As I have argued at
greater length elsewhere, constitutional principles of equality, liberty,
and citizenship are central to standard approaches to democracy. s°
78 See Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Foreword: The Constitutionalization of
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 44 (2004) (arguing for judicial review of democratic
procedures that focuses on constraining "the structural cancer of political self-entrenchment").
79 See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM
BAKER V. CARRTO BUSH V. GoRE83-100 (2003) (distinguishing core from contested principles);
see also id. at 138-56 (criticizing the structural approach to political-process claims); Pamela S.
Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v.
Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2001) (criticizing "'structural' equal protection" cases for
.not... protect[ingl the rights of an identifiable group of individuals").
80 SeeJane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 737, 746-50 (2004);Jane
S. Schacter, Lawrence v. Texas and the Fourteenth Amendment's Democratic Aspirations, 13 TEMP.
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That means, in turn, that nominally "social" rights that find protec-
tion in these Fourteenth Amendment norms-such as rights relating
to abortion or sexuality-might be understood as required by, or
relevant to, equal democratic citizenship, or to a vision of democracy
as "a society of equals."'81 This sort of constitutional reading, once
opened up, suggests that the idea of equal citizenship might forge a
conceptual link between procreative or sexual rights on the one hand
and democracy on the other. That link, in turn, takes us right back
to the paradox we saw in relation to the right to vote: it is problem-
atic to invoke democracy against a set of unenumerated rights
claimed to be inherent in, or a precondition of, democracy itself.
This analysis, in other words, deprives the invocation of democracy
against unenumerated rights of its self-evident, self-effectuating force,
and prompts consideration of what the requirements of democracy
are, once properly understood. Irrespective of how that difficult
question is answered, the debate is enriched by engaging these issues.
POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 733, 763-67 (2004). See generally DEMOCRACY: A READER (Ricardo Blaug
& John Schwarzmantel eds., 2001) (canvassing links between and among equality, autonomy,
citizenship and democracy).
81 Joshua Cohen, For a Democratic Society, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 86, 91-92
(Samuel Freedman ed., 2003).
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